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public relations’—and even more insidiously
because MPs, like most people, instinctively
strike up a rapport with outsiders from simi-
lar backgrounds to themselves. It is a point
which merits wider discussion and analysis.
These anthropologist’s observations are
enjoyable and insightful: Crewe has a great
eye for humanity and humour, and
writes (very) engagingly. But alone they
would not sustain a book, let alone an
academic one.
As she writes of her experiences, though,
the tone shifts, progressively, from observa-
tion to something more heartfelt: a defence
of the House of Commons, and of demo-
cratic politics itself. Not only does Crewe
believe that most MPs belie their (un)popu-
lar image by being hard-working, sacriﬁcing
privacy, family time, respect and (often)
income, to genuinely want to ‘do good’; she
also argues that public expectations are
unreasonable—even dangerous. Politics is by
nature about compromise, she observes:
indeed, the contradictions necessary to do
this are inherent in most if not all of our
lives. So politicians have to at once be con-
sidering individual constituents, their con-
stituency as a whole and the national good,
as well as special interests and their own
consciences; they must also be aware of his-
tory, act in the present and be mindful of the
future consequences of their actions. To
expect them to follow one path unswerv-
ingly would be to ask them to betray many
others whom they are elected to serve. A
good example is individuals and groups lob-
bying MPs both ways on voting to legalise
gay marriage, while some also had strong
personal views, often informed by their reli-
gion and/or views on individual liberty.
Sometimes Crewe’s defence stretches the
credulity of even someone like myself,
whose experience has made them so much
more respectful of MPs: she quotes a Labour
backbencher saying that they can ‘say “I
fully support my Leader” to the media and
then [go] to the tearoom and discuss how to
get rid of him. This is politics.’ To which
Crewe adds: ‘This is not just politics: that is
how people are.’ Others might argue that
not all people are hypocritical or deceitful,
and at the very least we can expect better of
people we elect to power. But this does not
detract from her more important concern:
‘Politics has to be murky, relying on
compromise and deals, because different and
rival interests, truths and traditions exist
under a common rule,’ she writes. ‘To
renounce politics is to destroy the very thing
that orders pluralism in non-violent ways
and keeps despotism at bay.’
Juliette Jowit writes for The Guardian
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Most people prefer to keep referring to the
self-proclaimed Islamic State by the acronym
of its previous name: ISIS, the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria (or, more accurately ‘al-
Sham’—Greater Syria—approximately translated
by some as ‘the Levant’, with the acronym
hence turned into ISIL). On this thus-named
ISIS, close to forty books and counting have
been hitherto published in English, of which
the three reviewed here are the best-selling
in the UK.
Of these, Patrick Cockburn’s was one of
the very ﬁrst books written on ISIS. It came
out in 2014 under the title The Jihadis Return.
The one reviewed here is an updated edition
with a new title. It recapitulates the views
that the author developed in his coverage of
events in Iraq and Syria for The Independent.
It is written in a most readable journalistic
style by an author who is well acquainted
with this part of the world, having covered
it for many years (especially Iraq). However,
the book contains hardly any references to
substantiate its numerous assertions other
than Cockburn’s personal testimony, often
quite anecdotal.
Yet, what is most questionable about this
book is its author’s heavy political bias,
which transpires at the end of the preface
when Cockburn quotes Vice-President Joe
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Biden’s statement about the lack of civilians
of the ‘moderate middle’ in the ranks of a
Syrian opposition which, so says Biden, is
exclusively composed of ‘soldiers’. Biden
was trying to justify the Obama administra-
tion’s refusal to provide the Syrian opposi-
tion with the defensive weapons it requested
—primarily anti-aircraft weapons. Patrick
Cockburn’s immoderate comment on Biden’s
statement is much telling: ‘Seldom have the
real forces at work in creating ISIS and the
present crisis in Iraq and Syria been so accu-
rately described.’
Any reader familiar with the region would
know what to expect from the book hencefor-
ward. Indeed, a few pages later Cockburn
cites an anonymous ‘intelligence ofﬁcer from
a neighbouring country’ (obviously Iraq,
whose Iran-dominated government backs
Syria’s Assad) to the effect that ISIS is pleased
when sophisticated weapons are sent to anti-
Assad groups, because it can always get them
by force or cash. In the same spirit, Cockburn
explains that he couldn’t ﬂy directly to Bagh-
dad in the summer of 2014 because, he was
told, ISIS had obtained shoulder-held anti-air-
craft missiles ‘originally supplied to anti-
Assad forces in Syria’—a statement that is
doubly untrue as, ﬁrst, no such weapons
were supplied to anti-Assad forces in Syria
and, second, the most sophisticated weapons
on which ISIS managed to lay its hands are
actually those supplied by the US to the Iraqi
army, which abandoned them ignominiously
in its debacle during the summer of 2014.
This erroneous account is matched soon
after by a highly disputable assertion: ‘It is
the government and media consensus in the
West that the civil war in Iraq was reignited
by the sectarian policies of Iraqi Prime Min-
ister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad. In reality it
was the war in Syria that destabilized
Iraq. . .’ This assertion ﬂies in the face of the
well-known fact that the vast mass protests
that started in Iraq’s Arab Sunni regions in
2012 and laid the ground for ISIS’s subse-
quent expansion in those same regions were
not about Syria in the least, but about Al-
Maliki’s sectarian drive, which had swung
into high gear as soon as the last American
combat troops left Iraq.
The truth is that Cockburn can barely
conceal his contempt for Iraq’s Arab Sunnis,
whom he often lumps together in a
homogeneous category ‘the Sunni’, facing a
no less homogeneous ‘the Shia’. Thus, he
tells us that ‘the Sunni’ are ‘unlikely to be
satisﬁed’ with regional autonomy and a lar-
ger share of jobs and oil revenues, and
would not be content with less than a ‘full
counterrevolution that aims to take back
power over all of Iraq’. One is left wonder-
ing how an informed author like Cockburn
could attribute the fantasy of an excited
fringe of Iraqi Arab Sunnis to a whole com-
munity. The fact is, however, that he seems
to have taken that fantasy for a fait accompli
since he asserts that, after ISIS’s offensive in
Iraq, the Shia leaders have ‘not grasped that
their domination over the Iraqi state. . . was
ﬁnished’ and that ‘only a Shia rump was
left’—an astonishing overstatement indeed.
Patrick Cockburn’s pro-Assad bias is also
blatant in the double standard with which
he judges ‘conspiracy theories’ depending on
which side they emanate from. Thus, says
he, ‘a conspiracy theory much favoured by
the rest of the Syrian opposition and by
Western diplomats, that ISIS and Assad are
in league, was shown to be false as ISIS won
victories on the battleﬁeld’. But Cockburn
does not tell the reader by which logic ISIS’s
victories on the Syrian battleﬁeld were in
and by themselves a refutation of the claim
by the Syrian opposition and Western diplo-
mats that the Assad regime had favoured
ISIS’s establishment and expansion in Syria
in order to weaken and discredit the Syrian
insurgency.
This claim was made in light of the wide-
spread conviction that Assad’s intelligence
services have been manipulating Iraq’s jiha-
dists from the time the US occupied that
country in 2003. In any event, the above-
quoted categorical dismissal of that ‘conspir-
acy theory’ stands in striking contrast with
Cockburn’s indulgence towards another that
is favoured by the opposite side. On the alle-
gation that the resurgence of ISIS was aided
by Turkish military intelligence, which he
attributes again to ‘one senior Iraqi source’,
Cockburn has this to say: ‘This might be dis-
missed as one more Middle East conspiracy
theory, but a feature of jihadist movements
is the ease with which they can be manipu-
lated by foreign intelligence services.’ In
sum, the ease with which ISIS can be manip-
ulated by intelligence services only applies
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to Turkish services in Cockburn’s view, not
to the Syrian ones.
Cockburn’s contempt for Iraq’s Arab Sun-
nis is matched by his dislike of the other
component of what he calls ‘the new Sunni
revolution’, namely the Syrian opposition.
His summary of the Syrian tragedy is una-
shamedly biased against the latter: ‘Syrians
have to choose between a violent dictator-
ship, in which power is monopolized by the
presidency and brutish security services, or
an opposition that shoots children in the face
for minor blasphemy and sends pictures of
decapitated soldiers to the parents of their
victims.’ With such a Hobbesian description
of the options, the barbaric atrocities and
crimes against humanity committed by the
Syrian Leviathan, composed of the whole
range of Assad regime’s armed forces and
their allies, are conveniently forgotten while
the opposition is reduced to killers of chil-
dren—even though the Syrian regime has
killed far more children than the opposition.
The author makes no secret of his personal
choice.
Cockburn’s leniency towards the Assad
regime even leads him to ﬁnd ‘some truth’
in one of the latter’s most blatant lies about
the early peaceful protests in 2011: ‘The gov-
ernment insists that protests were not as
peaceful as they looked and that from an
early stage their forces came under armed
attack. There is some truth to this, but if the
opposition’s aim was to trap the government
into a counterproductive punitive response,
it has succeeded beyond its dreams.’ Like-
wise, Patrick Cockburn goes so far as to give
credit to a common argument of all authori-
tarian regimes confronted with popular
mobilisations, an argument that is itself
steeped in ‘conspiracy theory’. He asserts
that ‘the revolutionaries of 2011 had many
failings but they were highly skilled in inﬂu-
encing and manipulating press coverage.
Tahrir Square in Cairo and later the Maidan
in Kiev became the arenas where a melo-
drama pitting the forces of good against evil
was played out in front of the television
cameras.’
In conclusion, Patrick Cockburn blames
the United States for ‘balking at giving mili-
tary assistance to those who were ﬁghting
ISIS, such as the Syrian army’—meaning the
Assad regime’s army, of course. Thus, unlike
the knee-jerk ‘anti-imperialist’ circles who
reject any form of intervention by Western
powers in any situation as a matter of reli-
gious taboo, and who abundantly quote
Cockburn on Syria, the Independent’s reporter
himself thinks that Washington ought to
support the Assad regime. ‘If the US had
been serious about combating the extremist
jihadists, then it would have realized it had
little alternative’, he afﬁrms. Of all stances
on Syria, the idea that supporting the Assad
regime is the best way to ﬁght ISIS—an
organisation that thrives on Sunni resent-
ment against the two Iran-backed govern-
ments of Damascus and Baghdad as well as
against the United States—is the most pre-
posterous indeed.
For a good and serious work on this
whole topic with none of the ﬂaws of Cock-
burn’s, one should read the book by Michael
Weiss and Hassan Hassan—by far the best
on ISIS to this date. Both authors are journal-
ists like Cockburn, and write for a variety of
publications. Yet their book is a serious piece
of research, based on interviews with vari-
ous actors across the range of parties
involved in the tragedy or concerned with it
—from US military to Iraqi and Syrian ofﬁ-
cials or former ofﬁcials, and to ISIS members
—as well as various experts. It is backed by
numerous references, including a host of
reports from sources ranging from govern-
mental agencies to human rights organisa-
tions. The authors’ experience and familiarity
with Syria are qualitatively different from
Cockburn’s. In their own words, ‘one of the
authors is a native Syrian from the border
town of Albu Kamal, which has long been a
portal for jihadists moving into, and now
out of, Iraq. The other author has reported
from the Aleppo suburb of al-Bab, once a
cradle of Syria’s independent and pro-demo-
cratic civil society; today, it is a dismal ISIS
ﬁef ruled by Sharia law.’
In the ﬁrst chapters, Weiss and Hassan
describe the rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq during
the disastrous American occupation, its radi-
calisation into the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’, its
subsequent marginalisation when US strat-
egy shifted towards co-opting Arab Sunni
tribes and how this was jeopardised by Al-
Maliki’s sectarian policy once freed from the
constraints of US occupation. They then
explore the duplicity of the Assad regime in
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dealing with US-occupied Iraq and how this
preceded ISIS’s emergence in war-torn Syria.
They describe the Assad regime’s direct role
in fostering the ‘jihadisation’ of the Syrian
insurgency as well as the way it provoked
sectarianism by unleashing a criminal sectar-
ian militia; they then assess the role of Iran
and its regional proxies in propping up
Damascus, how the Arab Gulf monarchies
played a key role in promoting that same ‘ji-
hadisation’ and how the corruption of the
Syrian opposition by Gulf money facilitated
the spread of an ISIS that projected the
image of a law-and-order enforcing ‘state’.
Finally, they describe the contours of this so-
called Islamic State and provide a proﬁle of
their ﬁghters and how they are recruited.
This last aspect is central to the book by
Jessica Stern, who lectures on terrorism at
Harvard, and J. M. Berger, a journalist who
has written on American jihadists. Although
it is quite substantial, their book reads as if
it were written for the For Dummies series,
sounding like a brieﬁng for the kind of US
security personnel and politicians who
would have some difﬁculty spotting the
Middle East on a world map. The inevitable
supplements of the genre are there: a
glossary that includes deﬁnitions of basic
terms along with more uncommon ones, and
an appendix written by a doctoral student
who offers a historical survey covering the
fourteen centuries between the founding of
Islam and that of ISIS—all in twenty-four
pages.
Stern and Berger’s book contains much
padding: for example, several pages sum-
marising articles or videos produced by ISIS.
It says little on the Syrian and Iraqi context
and the role of the US occupation in the
emergence of ISIS, with only an occasional
hint at the 2003 ‘blunder’ of the invasion
and occupation of Iraq. A few interesting
insights, such as a comparison between ISIS
and other brands of apocalyptic terrorism,
are frustratingly short. The book ends with
the authors’ policy advice on how to counter
ISIS propaganda, not without some plati-
tudes such as the following statement on its
last page: ‘King Abdullah of Jordan, who
has shown himself to be extraordinarily
courageous, argues that ﬁghting ISIS will
require the Muslim world to work together.’
Sigh!
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